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Abstract
Animated movements of simple geometric shapes can readily be interpreted as depicting social events in which animate
agents are engaged in intentional activity. However, the brain regions associated with such intention have not been clearly
elucidated. In this study, intentional bias was manipulated using shape and pattern animations while measuring associated
brain activity using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Twenty-five higher-intention involved and
twenty-five lower-intention involved animations were presented to participants. Behavioral results showed that the degree
of agency attribution of the mental state increased as intentional involvement increased. fMRI results revealed that the
posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), inferior temporal gyrus (ITG), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), premotor, temporal pole,
supramarginal gyrus, and superior parietal lobule (SPL) were activated while participants viewed the high-intention
animations. In contrast, occipital, lingual, and middle frontal gyri were activated while the participants viewed the low-
intention animations. These findings suggest that as agent attribution increases, the visual brain changes its functional role
to the intentional brain and becomes a flexible network for processing information about social interaction.
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Introduction
Recent evidence from cognitive social neuroscience has
accelerated our understanding of intricate social brain functions,
including processes involving the perception of others and their
apparent behavior. However, relatively little research has been
conducted to evaluate agency and its role in intentional bias.
Moreover, there is limited evidence regarding how the intentional
brain can be differentiated from the visual brain. For example,
some configural cues such as contingent movement of geometrical
patterns trigger an agency or animacy detectors in the brain that
can partially explain intentional agents such as other people’s
minds.
We hypothesize that the specific intentional brain function of
estimating others’ mental states based on agency attribution is an
extended version of the visual brain. This extension involves
recruiting higher brain regions found in the temporo-parietal
cortices like the superior temporal sulcus (STS) [1]. The social
braininvolves consciousness of one’s own and others’ mental states,
intentions, attitudes, beliefs and motives and, therefore, is closely
related to the theory of mind (ToM) and intentional agents. The
ToM requires the ability to estimate the intentional states of
others. Estimating another’s state of mind involves modeling the
other person’s intention, possibly by agency attribution and one’s
own past experience.
Current social neuroscience studies suggest that the superior
temporal sulcus (STS) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) are
likely essential components of the social brain region involved in
intentional tasks. In order to examine this issue, we developed
simple animations that manipulated intentional bias (higher- and
lower-intention involved animations) by representing geometrical
shapes as opposed to complex verbal or visual tasks.
In their seminal research, Heider and Simmel (1944) [2] and
Michotte (1963) [3] used simple moving geometrical patterns as
intention-involving agents in a local environment (i.e., a house
having walls and a door). In Heider and Simmel’s classic
experiment, observers were asked to interpret a moving-picture
film in which three geometrical figures (i.e., a large triangle (‘‘T’’),
a small triangle (‘‘t’’) and a circle (‘‘c’’)) moved in various
directions. A rectangle (‘‘house’’) with a wall section that opened
and closed as a door was also shown. In their original film
sequence, the animation was as follows. When the door opened,
‘‘t’’ and ‘‘c’’ moved into the ‘‘house.’’ Then, ‘‘T’’ moved into the
‘‘house’’ and shut the door. Next, ‘‘T’’ and ‘‘t’’ fought and ‘‘T’’
won. Finally, ‘‘t’’ and ‘‘c’’ broke through the door and ran away
from the house. This work suggests that moving shapes can
simulate the actions of living beings and, therefore, can represent
agents performing actions. Accordingly the moving shapes are
perceived to have goals and to possess qualities of an intentional
mind. Therefore, the moving shapes are likely observed as if they
represent the intentional states of others.
In his theory of interpersonal relations, Heider proposed that
individuals perceive and create explanations for the behavior of
other’s, a process he called ‘‘attribution’’ [4]. Researchers have
documented that higher-order cognition involving concepts such
as causality and agency can be elicited by observing interactions,
but not by observing the independent random movements of
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simple geometrical objects. If animations could possibly evoke
mental state attributions based on intention, we propose that
attributions of a mental state can be applied to animated objects. If
this supposition is true, it would suggest that the neural substrate
associated with understanding intentional events would include the
same substrate (i.e., the STS) that becomes active when watching
an interactive animated object in cooperation with other regions
[5]. To date, however, there have been few empirical studies to
investigate why and how these attributions are affected by
animations containing objects with lower- or higher-intentional
involvement.
In mentalization studies in which the ability to estimate
another’s mind is required, the observer must infer and model
the intentions of another person. In this type of paradigm, the
observer models the behavior of the other person prospectively by
using attributions that are represented as animated dots or
cartoons. For example, Baron-Cohen et al. (1994) [6] found a
rCB (regional cerebral blood flow) increase in the orbitofrontal
cortex of the right hemisphere during the TOM task. Abel,
Happe, and Frith, using two triangles moving around the screen in
one of three ways (ToM-like, in a goal-directed way, or randomly),
compared the attribution of the mental state in autistic children
having less TOM than that of normal children, finding that the
former used mentalizing (ToM-like) descriptions less often than the
latter did [7].
In another study, Schultz et al. presented short animations to
participants in which two moving disks appeared to be either
interacting or moving independently from each other [8]. Using
fMRI, they found that activation in the STS increased in
proportion to the degree of correlation between the motion of
two disks, and that an increase in correlation increased the amount
of interactivity and animacy the observers attributed to the two
disks.
Perception of animacy also influences interactive behavior [9].
Recent fMRI studies using non-Heider & Simmel patterns showed
that the STS is also activated by simple moving objects whose
interactions appear causal or intentional [10] and that the STS is
involved in the representation of observed intentional actions [11].
Saxe et al. presented a real movie of a human walking into a room
with or without occlusion (e.g., bookcase), finding that the walking
figure activated the right posterior STS, which appears to be
sensitive to the relationship between the observed motion and local
environment [11]. They further hypothesized that the right
posterior STS is involved in the representation of observed
intentional actions.
In a study using PET, Castelli, Happe and Frith presented
participants with a silent, computer-generated animation involving
two simple geometric shapes (e.g., triangles) that resembled Heider
and Simmel patterns [12]. They found that the STS, MPFC, and
temporal regions, including the fusiform gyrus, temporal pole, and
occipital gyrus, were activated. The investigators argued that these
animations strongly evoked mental state attributions based on
intentions and hypothesized that the ability to make inferences
about another’s mental state evolved from the ability to make
inferences about another’s apparent behavior. Their findings
suggest that controlling the degree of intention from high to low
evoked by animations that vary in attribution appears to be critical
in this type of research. They had six adult participants observe an
animation that involved two moving triangles that manipulated
the degree of intention from high to low in three ways: 1) ToM-
like, corresponding to high intention; 2) goal-directed, correspond-
ing to intermediate intention; and 3) randomly, corresponding to
low-intention intention. These stimuli could therefore be graded
from random movements to goal-directed actions, and finally to
complex intentional states.
The primary goal of the current work was to evaluate the degree
to which intentional bias could result in greater STS activation
and less MPFC activation. Similar animations were used such that
objects always stayed within the same local region. However,
animations differed in terms of their movements. Specifically,
some animations were designed to give a graded impression of
either intentional-oriented interactions or mechanical-oriented
movements [13]. In other words, a primary aim of our study was
to describe how the social brain is influenced by animations that
evoke high intention relative to less or no intention. We sought to
replicate and extend the findings of Castelli et al. [12] using a
larger sample and event-related technology, and by grading stimuli




Twelve healthy, right-handed participants (4 males and 8
females; mean age = 25.2) and fifteen separate participants (11
males and 4 females, mean age = 25.8) were recruited for the
fMRI experiment and preliminary rating study, respectively. All
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were screened for
the presence of current or past neurological and psychiatric
disorder.
Ethics Statement
The experiment was conducted in accordance with the
guidelines of the ethical committees of the Brain Activity Imaging
Center (ATR, Kyoto, Japan) and of Kyoto University. All
individuals voluntarily participated in the study and provided
their written, informed consent prior to study participation.
Procedure
The animations used in the study was modeled on that of
Heider and Simmel [2]. Figure 1 depicts examples of the five-
second animations (moving from left to right) used. Two or three
triangles of different colors (blue, pink, and green) moved around
on a black background. These triangles corresponded to the ‘‘t,’’
‘‘c,’’ and ‘‘T’’ stimuli used in the Heider and Simmel animation.
Additionally, the animation had a ‘‘house’’ with a gap on its side
wall.
The upper panel of Figure 1 shows a high-intention-involved
animation (rated 5.77 and corresponding to condition i = 1 in
Figure 2; see movies for details). In our preliminary study (see
below), one participant reported a ToM-like story corresponding
to the high-intention-involved animation as follows: ‘‘When the
door of the ‘house’ opened, the blue and pink triangles moved in.
Then, a green triangle moved in. Green and pink fought and
green won. Blue and pink broke out of the ‘house’ and ran away.
Based on this script, the two triangles were chased and persecuted
by the green triangle and each triangl moved in an interactive way.
The lower panel of Figure 1 depicts a low-intention-involved
animation (rated 1.79 and corresponding to condition r = 1 in
Figure 2; see movie file in detail). In our preliminary study (see
below), a typical response to a story corresponding to one of the
low-intention-involved animations as follows: ‘‘Triangles moved
merely randomly or drifting without interaction’’. By varying the
motion path of the triangles, 25 different pairs consisting of one
high- and one low-intentionality animation were designed for a
total of 50 animations. Interactive motion (two triangles chased
and persecuted by the third triangle) was varied by the
Intentional Bias on Agency Attribution
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experimente. In order to test the effect of the number of objects,
we used three triangles in all but six pair in which the green
triangle did not appear. The animations were created and encoded
using Adobe Flash CS3 (30 flames per second, 3206320 pixel).
Preliminary study
In the preliminary behavioral study, 15 participants rated each
animation based on an intentionality score. The intentional score
was rated using a Likert-type scale of 1 to 7 (1: not at all
intentional; 7: highly intentional). Next we selected 25 ‘‘high’’ and
25 ‘‘low’’ intentionality animations. Observers were asked to rate
intentionality between the blue object and the other objects based
on their mutual actions.
Pairs of high- and low-intention animations were created. Their
paths of motion are shown in Figure 2. The highest-intention
animation was created in a manner similar to the Heider and
Simmel [2] pattern (Figure 1 upper panel, which corresponds to
i = 1 motion path in Figure 2). The lowest intention (i.e., random)
animation was made by simple drifting (Figure 1 lower panel,
which corresponds to r = 1 motion path in Figure 2). We also
made a series of different intermediate animation pairs for a total
of 25 pairs ranging from (i = 1, r = 1) to (i = 25, r = 25), where i and
r indicates intention and random, respectively. Thus, we matched
animation to have a similar motion path length and time for all
triangles within a pair. Based upon this design, it was expected that
participants would judge the triangles in a pair (for example,
i = 19, r = 19 shown in Figure 2) to be somehow different from
each other in terms of intentionality, while triangles in another
pair (for example, i = 1(highest), r = 1(lowest) shown in Figure 1
and 2) would be much different from each other Thus, we created
a total of 25 graded steps of stimulus pairs. Of the 25 animations,
the mean intentionality score was 5.77 in the ‘‘high’’ group and
1.79 in the ‘‘low’’ group.
A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA (intention6animation
number) revealed a significant main effect for intentionality
[F(1,14) = 768.9, p,.001] and stimulus number
[F(24,336) = 4.82, p,.001]. We also found significant interaction
between intentionality and stimulus number [F(24,336) = 6.35,
p,.001]. Multiple comparisons using Turkey’s HSD revealed
significant differences between high- and low-rated scores. Thus,
we confirmed that the higher-rated group was significantly more
sensitive to intention than the lower-rated group. T-tests
comparisons between the number of objects (2 to 3 objects) found
no differences in terms of intentionality. Based on these
preliminary findings, we adopted all the stimulus objects tested
for later experiments.
fMRI session
No participants who participated in the preliminary study
participated in the fMRI study. In an fMRI session, an animation
was presented one second after a beep tone and an evaluation
screen appeared which asked the participant to rate the level of
intentionality from one (high) to four (low). Participants made
ratings by choosing from two sets of four buttons (one set for each
hand). One trial took 17 s, resulting in a total of length of 14 min
30 s for each session. For the first session, fifty moving patterns
were presented in random order to participants in a counter-
balanced manner. Twenty-five patterns were presented to the high
group and to the low group, respectively. In the second session,
Figure 1. Typical animation strips from high- and low-intention groups, each 5 seconds in length from left to right. Three geometrical
objects of different colors (blue, red, and green triangle) move around a black background containing a ‘‘house,’’ which has a gap on its side wall.
Preceding the experiment, 2 sets of 25 animation movies each were developed that involve high- and low-intentionality groups. The movies varied in
terms of the ratio of degree of attribution of mental states to animated pattern. For example, when the door opened, blue and red move into the
‘‘house’’. Then, green moves into the ‘‘house’’ and shuts the door. Green and blue fights and green wins. Blue and red broke the door and they ran
away from the ‘‘house’’ under the highest intentionality condition (rated 5.77), while figures move in parallel under the lowest intentionality condition
(rated 1.79).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049053.g001
Figure 2. Samples of matched animation sequence from left to
right with a 1 s interval between sequences. The upper panel
depicts matched pairs (i = 9, r = 9; three triangles) and the lower panel
depicts other matched pairs (i = 19, r = 19; two triangles). I = intention;
R = random.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049053.g002
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up-down reversed patterns from the first session were presented.
The presentation of normal and up-down reversed patterns was
counter-balanced for each participant. In the preliminary study,
we confirmed that participants could easily decide a response after
reading the agent’s intention 3 s after presentation. Therefore, the
fMRI scan began 3 s after the animation presentation.
Animations were back-projected onto a screen viewed through
an angled mirror. The size of each animation was 11.5u611.5u. In
one session, participants observed 50 animations presented in
random order. The length of each trial was 17 seconds.
fMRI data acquisition
Whole brain images were acquired on a 1.5-T whole-body
magnetic resonance imaging scanner (Shimadzu-Marconi Magnex
Eclipse, Kyoto, Japan). Head motion was minimized with a
forehead strap. Functional MRI was performed with a gradient
echo-planer imaging (TR=3000 ms, TE= 49 ms, flip angle = 90u,
5 mm slice thickness, FOV=192 mm6192 mm, and pixel matrix
64664). After the collection of functional images, T1-weighted
images (154 slices with no gap) using a conventional spin echo
pulse sequence (TR=12 ms, TE=5 ms, flip angle = 8u,
FOV=220 mm6220 mm, and pixel matrix 2566256) were
collected for anatomical co-registration with the functional images.
After image reconstruction, functional images were analyzed
using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London, UK). Six initial images were discarded from the analysis
to eliminate the non-equilibrium effects of magnetization. All
functional images were corrected for between-slice timing
differences in image acquisition and realigned to correct for head
movement, which was less than 1 mm within runs. The functional
images were normalized and spatially smoothed with an isotropic
Gaussian filter (6 mm full-width at half-maximum). Low-frequen-
cy noise was removed by high-pass filtering (time con-
stant = 128 s). We conducted the analysis using an event-related
design. An onset of an event according to the data analysis
occurred three seconds after an animation started based on the
results of the preliminary study.
Data were modeled by convolving the vector of expected neural
activity with the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF)
included in SPM2 and modulated by ratings of intentionality (4-
point scales: high for 4 and low for 1). Single-participant t-contrast
images were then entered into second-level analysis using a
random effects model for all participants. The levels of statistical
significance for these analyses were set to p,0.001 (uncorrected).
Results
Two contrasts were specified per single-participant analysis: 1)
Low versus High and 2) High versus Low. Low-intention involves
activations under participant’s button press 1 (highest) and 2
(higher) and high-intention involves that of button press 3 (lowest)
and 4 (lower). As shown in Figure 3 and Table 1, fMRI revealed
activation of three main areas when participants observed 25 low-
intention-involved animations (low.high): the left middle occipital
areas including the calcarine sulcus/cuneus (BA17,18), the right
lingual gyrus (BA18), and the right prefrontal gyrus in the middle
prefrontal cortex (BA9). However, when participants observed 25
high-intention-involved animations and intentional bias was
increased (high.low), the activated areas extended to include
the bilateral posterior STS sulcus (BA22/37/39), the right
temporal pole (BA38), the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus
(BA47:IFG), the premotor (BA6), the inferior temporal gyrus
(ITG), the left supramarginal gyrus, and the left superior parietal
lobule (SPL). We did not find any activation in the MPFC
(Table 1).
Discussion
In this study, we sought to investigate the differential
contributions of the areas involved in visual and intentional
cognitive processes. Participants conducted tasks that required
them to make social interpretations by looking at moving objects
that were presented as low- or high-intentionally biased anima-
tions. By varying the stimuli, we varied the extent to which
intentional cognitive processing was required, which facilitated the
analysis of intentional and perceptual influences on various brain
regions.
Based upon event-related fMRI data, our results revealed
activation of several visual areas including the calcarine sulcus/
cuneus and the lingual gyrus (BA17, 18), which is near the fusiform
gyru when the visual brain operated in a mechanical low-
intention-involved context. The middle frontal gyrus is thought to
maintain visual attention to groups of moving objects [13]. In
contrast, the fusiform gyrus is believed to play a general role in the
representation of visual stimuli that signify intent, independent of
the visual form [14]. Our finding of activation in the lingual gyrus,
which is near the fusiform gyrus corroborates with a previous study
[14].
As shown in Table 1, when the brain processes high-intention-
involved interactive animations, activation in the posterior STS
involving part of the supramarginal area increased. It has been
demonstrated that the STS becomes activated while viewing
animated geometrical figures portraying social interactions
[5,13,14] and when evaluating the intentions of others. Using
fMRI, Gobbini et al. [14] reported that social animations activated
an extensive portion of the STS including areas in the posterior
STS as well as the inferior parietal lobule.
In an earlier PET study, Castelli et al. [12] presented
animations that featured two characters (a large red triangle and
a small blue triangle) moving on a framed white background
similar to Heider and Simmel’s pattern [2]. The investigators
presented each participant with three types of animation: 1) ToM
(two triangles bluffing one another); 2) goal-directed (two triangles
dancing together); and 3) random (two triangles merely drifting).
These animations were displayed for approximately 40 s over the
course of 12 scans and divided into two consecutive counterbal-
anced blocks consisting of cued and uncued animations. These
animations were designed to evoke mentalizing and elicited
activity in the STS relative to a random motion condition. The
design of the current study improved that done by Castelli et al. in
two ways. First, intentional biases were manipulated continuously
from highest to lowest by 25 matched pairs selected from 50
animations using ratings from the participants in a preliminary
study. Second, an event-related design was introduced to avoid
prior knowledge by using a shorter presentation duration (5 s).
Based on our results, it is likely that intentional bias may be
controlled more by the STS than by the MPFC, particularly when
brain responses to high-intention-involved animations are com-
pared with responses to low-intention-involved animations.
The STS has been hypothesized to be closely connected to the
perception of biological motion. Studies using transcranial
magnetic stimulation [15] and magnetoencephalography [16]
have shown that the simulation of human walking induced by
moving dots selectively activates a brain area on the ventral bank
in the occipital extent of the STS and the right temporo-parietal
junction. Furthermore, such animations may be similar to the
Heider and Simmel [2] paradigm. We show here that tasks
Intentional Bias on Agency Attribution
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tapping mentalization and agency attribution activated the same
brain regions in the STS and temporo-parietal cortices including
the supramarginal gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus, the temporal
pole, and the SPL. One explanation for why we did not find
activation in the MPFC is that we used an event-related design to
avoid expectancy with a much shorter presentation time than the
30 s previously reported [12]. Expectancy cueing and longer
presentation time could also yield possible contingent activations
in the MPFC in addition to controlling intentional bias in the STS.
It is highly possible, therefore, that higher-intention-involved
animations, such as the fight between the blue and green triangle
used in the current study, was perceived by the observer as though
he/she was participating in the action against an antagonis.
Indeed, humans may possibly detect intentions in shapes, even
when those shapes change their motion to face another object [9].
Overall, we assumed that activation in the premotor cortex
invoked a mirror system when a human acts and when the person
observes the same action performed by anothe [17]. This system
may be important for understanding the actions of other people,
and that of the geometrical shapes in our animations. Some
researchers also speculate that mirror systems may simulate
observed actions, thus contributing to ToM skills [18,19]. In the
premotor area, a functional mirror system estimating others’
intentions may contribute to activation of the IFG [20]. In the
current study, significant increases of activation in the IFG were
observed only when the animations were actively viewed with
intention. Therefore, it is possible that the IFG monitors
intentional thoughts in the STS. In contrast, activity in visual
areas, including the lingual gyrus, which is near the fusiform gyrus,
was only found in conditions requiring less intentional involvement
and passive viewing.
With close interconnections to the STS, the IFG and the
temporal pole provide internally-represented self and other’s
mental states. Rather than the MPFC per se, it is the ventral side
of the IFG, close to the orbitofrontal PFC and temporal pole,
along with temporo-parietal-junction areas including the posterior
STS and supramarginal gyrus [11]) that are possible critical
components for the representation of another’s mental state. Saxe
et al. [11] examined whether activation of the posterior STS,
similar to the perception of intentionality, depends particularly on
the contingency between an agent’s motion and the environment
by introducing short and long occlusions of a walking person’s
animation strip. They showed that right posterior STS activation
occurred following the long occlusion (i.e., when a person
remained hidden for a few seconds before re-emerging). In the
current study, we found activation in the same region; namely, the
bilateral posterior STS, using simple geometric animations
depicting high-intention-involved action. The present study
suggests that the posterior STS is involved in constructing an
abstract visual description of another agent’s intentional actions,
without engagement of the MPFC. Based on the present results, it
is possible that incoming animated information is decoded
perceptually and integrated with contextual interpretation; the
constituent product of these two processes can be understood
either in terms of perceptual- or intention-involved behaviors.
In their examination of the neural correlates of mentalization,
Vogeley et al. (2001) [21] used fMRI to investigate common and
differential neural mechanisms underlying ToM and the self
during the presentation of a verbal story, finding that a ToM task
led to increased neural activity in the temporal pole, whereas the
Figure 3. Brain activation regions for highRlow-intention corresponding to the social brain (i.e., yellow area) and areas for
lowRhigh-intention corresponding to the perceptual brain (i.e., blue area). Event-related fMRI results showed that main activation areas
occurred in three regions while participants observed low-intention animations: extrastriate cortices including calcarine sulcus and lingual gyrus (BA
17,18), and right middle frontal gyrus (BA9). During high-intention animations, activation of more widespread regions was observed, including:
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (BA47:IFG), premotor (BA6:PM), superior temporal sulcus (BA22/37/39: STS), inferior temporal gyrus(ITG), left
supramarginal gyrus (SMG), left superior parietal lobule (BA 7: SPL), and right temporal pole (BA38:TP).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049053.g003
Table 1. Brain region of activation for each contrast.
BA x y z Z
Region of activation
Low.High
Middle frontal gyrus R 9 30 46 20 4.11
Calcarine sulcus/cuneus L 17/18 210 292 16 4.48
Lingual gyrus R 18 12 270 22 3.93
High.Low
Inferior frontal gyrus L 47 251 25 2 4.97
R 47 50 20 19 3.83
Premotor area L 6 253 5 20 4.42
R 6 44 4 50 3.87
Superior temporal sulcus L 37/39 255 262 10 4.83
Superior temporal sulcus R 22/37 48 242 11 4.81
Temporal pole R 38 44 7 221 4.63
Inferior temporal gyrus R 37 48 268 2 4.48
Supramarginal gyrus L 40 257 227 35 4.28
Superior parietal lobule L 7 232 241 67 4.03
Parahippocampal gyrus L 36 226 243 28 3.96
Note: Uncorrected p,0.001, BA, Brodmann area:
L, Left: R, Right.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049053.t001
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self-task led to increased neural activity in the right temporo-
parietal junction involving the STS. Interestingly, our data
corroborate theirs regarding the neural correlates of ToM despite
the large differences in the methods employed. The ability to
model another intentional mind using an animated patter could be
an evolutionary innovation in the human social brain that
developed from the perceptual brain. Further investigations are
necessary in order to clarify this issue.
Conclusion
To summarize, we investigated how the visual brain transitions
to the social brain using event-related fMRI in the present study.
Animations consisted of moving patterns evoking various mental
states of attribution based on intentions. Among 25 pairs of
animations, each participant rated the higher- and lower-intention
animation according to their attribution of agency (i.e., internal or
external). Results showed that activations of the posterior STS,
ITG, IFG, premotor, temporal pole, supramarginal gyrus, and
SPL occurred under high-intention–involved animations, whereas
occipital, lingual, and middle frontal gyri were activated under
lower-intention-involved animations.
Findings of the present study suggest that as intentional stance
increased, the portion of the social brain involving the represen-
tation of an agent’s intentional actions became more activated.
Thus, developing the capacity to model another’s mind could be
an evolutionary innovation in the human social brain that
developed from the perceptual brain. Previous studies have
implicated regions activated by higher intention in self-monitoring
in the perception of biological motion and in the attribution of
mental states, and regions activated by lower-intention in simple
perceptual processing. In the present study, we report how the
visual brain shifts to the social brain in an agency attribution
experiment. We suggest that as agent attribution increases, the
visual brain changes to the intention-assuming social brain and
therefore possesses a flexible network for processing information
about social interactions based on agency attribution.
Supporting Information
Movie S1 An example movie under high-intention
condition.
(AVI)
Movie S2 An example movie under low-intention con-
dition.
(AVI)
Movie S3 An example movie under intermediate high-
intention condition.
(AVI)
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